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TRADITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE
 The Internet will soon turn fifty, if one views its inception as the 
late 1960s milestone when the first packets were exchanged between 
university research sites over ARPANET.  By any measure, the global 
Internet has been a phenomenal achievement. It has changed the way 
we interact, work, shop, learn, and carry out our day-to-day lives. It 
has spurred new industries and launched some of the world’s most 
successful multinational companies.  More than three billion people 
use the Internet and this will quickly grow to five billion. The majority 
of this new growth will be in the developing world. Every sector of the 
global economy—including commerce and financial transactions—is 
now dependent upon the Internet to function. Despite many 
challenges—from global disparities in access to widespread 
government censorship and surveillance—the network’s growth and 
success can convey a sense of inevitability that the Internet will 
continue to be universal, stable, and secure.  
 Part of what has enabled this growth and success over time is a 
dependable—albeit constantly evolving—system of Internet 
governance, meaning the administration and coordination of the 
technologies necessary to keep the Internet operational and the 
enactment of substantive policy around these technologies. The 
Internet is and has always been governed, but there is no single 
system. Rather, there is layer upon layer of distinct functions, some 
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carried out by the private sector, some by new global institutions, and 
some by governments. The Internet governance ecosystem can 
generally be divided into six functions:1 
1. The administration of critical Internet resources such
as names and numbers;
2. The establishment of Internet technical standards (e.g.
TCP/IP, HTTP);
3. Access and interconnection coordination;
4. Cybersecurity governance;
5. The policy role of private information intermediaries;
and
6. Architecture-based intellectual property rights
enforcement.
 The Internet requires a great deal of technical and administrative 
coordination. For example, the unique domain names and numbers 
(Internet addresses) of cyberspace, as well as the Domain Name 
System that serves, to some degree, as the Internet’s phone book for 
these unique identifiers, are administered and managed by a variety of 
entities. These entities include the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), private domain name registrars that 
sell domain name registrations, Internet registries that manage how 
names and numbers are mapped in a given top-level domain (TLD), 
and also the United States Commerce Department, which has 
retained, as of this writing, its historic coordinating role in regard to 
Internet names and numbers.  
 Someone also has to establish the technical standards that enable 
technologies made by different companies to seamlessly exchange 
information; the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and dozens of other standard-setting 
organizations have traditionally carried out much of this activity. The 
work of these relatively new global institutions is largely done by 
technical experts, who primarily work for private technology 
companies. In the area of interconnection, telecommunication 
1 LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014). 
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companies enact private contractual peering and transit agreements 
for how their networks conjoin bilaterally or at Internet Exchange 
Points (IXPs) to collectively form the global Internet.  Private 
companies, like Facebook and Google, also directly enact public policy 
through their terms of service agreements and intermediation policies 
in regard to privacy, free speech, intellectual rights enforcement, 
cyberbullying, and other areas that directly affect individual civil 
liberties. Another critical area of Internet oversight is cybersecurity 
governance, which is carried out by a combination of public and 
private institutions.  
 Across all these areas, governments make laws about cybercrime, 
identity theft, online privacy, the protection of children online, global 
online trade, intellectual property, and a host of other national, 
regional, and international policies related to digital information 
policy. As this brief list conveys, these various tasks are carried out by 
a combination of private companies, new global institutions formed to 
perform specific oversight functions; national laws and policies; and 
international agreements. A unique feature of Internet governance is 
that it is carried out not only in regulatory and oversight functions, 
but also in the actual design and implementation of technology and in 
the business models that monetize this technology.  
 These various control points are not merely technical decision 
points, but also political points of control that affect innovation policy 
and determine human rights—such as freedom of expression and 
privacy. How Web standards are designed determines online 
accessibility for the disabled; social media terms of service make 
decisions about individual privacy; access regulations, such as net 
neutrality rulings, make decisions about what counts as a so-called 
free and open Internet; and the administration of domain names 
involves resolving trademark disputes and conflicts related to global 
competition and innovation.  Collectively, Internet governance 
involves a combination of privatized and public oversight, the rise of 
new transnational organizations, and highly specialized technical 
design and coordination. This global ecosystem of coordination has 
kept the Internet operational, expansive, relatively secure, and 
innovative.  
 The Internet itself has changed constantly over the past fifty years: 
most obviously with the rise of the Web in the 1990s, the 
popularization of social media in the 2000s, the global surge in mobile 
services and smartphones, and the emergence of the “Internet of 
Things” in which more things—cars, devices, appliances, wearable 
technology, and industrial sensors—are connected to the Internet than 
people. It can be argued that the Internet has also stayed the same in 
that its underlying technical architecture and administration have 
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embodied a specific set of aspirational principles shaping the design 
and administration of the network and, in turn, contributed to the 
growth and generative qualities of cyberspace. The Internet Society 
(ISOC) has referred to these principles as “Internet invariants,” 
suggesting “it’s important to understand what is actually important 
and unchanging about the Internet—the invariants that have been 
true to date.”2 Some of these invariant principles suggested by ISOC 
include: global reach, the ability of any endpoint to address any other 
endpoint regardless of location; general purpose, the capacity to 
support a wide range of applications and services; permission-less 
innovation, a condition in which anyone can choose to establish a new 
service or application that connects over the Internet without having 
to seek consent from a gatekeeper; accessibility, the capability for 
anyone to get online as a user or producer; and interoperability 
among diverse networks. Some of the general governance principles 
ISOC mentions include collaboration among stakeholders, mutual 
agreement, and there being “no permanent favorites” so that 
innovation can continuously occur. As distinguished Internet engineer 
Leslie Daigle has said, “[t]hese conditions need to be maintained as 
the Internet continues to evolve. A network that does not have these 
characteristics is a lesser thing than the Internet as it has been 
experienced to date.”3 
 These design and coordination traditions, while imperfect and 
always involving tensions between both competing stakeholders and 
competing values, have contributed to a relatively stable system of 
governance, as well as constituting the technical norm of open 
platforms upon which content can flow and nearly any service 
connect. This universality and interoperability have contributed to the 
trust necessary for investment, industry adoption, and social reliance 
on the network.   
 Unfortunately, this stability and potential for growth cannot be 
taken for granted. Several developments in both the perception and 
substance of how the Internet is governed directly contravene many of 
these traditions. These potentially destabilizing conditions in Internet 
governance include:  
2 Internet Invariants: What Really Matters, INTERNET SOCIETY, Feb. 3, 2012, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet-invariants-what-really-matters. 
3 Leslie Daigle, On the Nature of the Internet, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE PAPER SERIES NO. 7, Mar. 2015, 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper_no7.pdf. 
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1. A measurable loss of trust in cyberspace due to high-
profile cybersecurity breaches and increasing public
awareness of government surveillance;
2. An emerging phenomenon of governments co-opting
the Domain Name System for outside purposes such as
censorship, surveillance, and intellectual property
rights enforcement;
3. Uncertainty about the outcome of the United States
transitioning its historic oversight of certain
coordinating functions of Internet names and numbers;
4. Tangible attempts to overlay national borders on the
global Internet, such as through infrastructure
restrictions and data localization; and
5. A resurgence in proprietary and differentiated
approaches designed to prioritize certain business
models, services, and content over others.
This essay elucidates these structural changes in the Internet 
governance ecosystem and suggests how they require global resolution 
to forestall negative implications for the future of innovation, 
individual rights, and the stable constitution of technical 
infrastructure in the Internet’s next decades. 
DESTABILIZING FACTOR #1: A LOSS OF TRUST IN CYBERSPACE 
 Even while there is growing societal dependence on the Internet, 
there is a loss of trust in this very system. This concern stems from 
several phenomena. One is increasing public awareness of 
government surveillance online. A 2014 global poll of more than 
23,000 Internet users in twenty-four countries found that two thirds 
of users were more concerned about digital privacy than they had 
been in the prior year (see Figure 1).4 This poll was taken in the year 
following U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden’s disclosures 
about the expansiveness of NSA surveillance practices online.  
4 Centre for International Governance Innovation & Ipsos, CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on 
Internet Security and Trust, CIGI, https://www.cigionline.org/internet-survey (reached 
23,376 Internet users in twenty-four countries, and was carried out between October 7, 
2014 and November 12, 2014). 
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Figure 1. CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust 
 A separate United States-only survey conducted by Pew Research 
Center sought to assess the ways American users changed their online 
behavior, among those aware of government surveillance programs. 
The survey found that twenty-five percent of Americans altered their 
behavior in at least one way, such as how they used search engines, 
email, cell phones, or text messaging.5 Publicity over government 
surveillance has also unmasked the essential role of the private sector 
in making surveillance possible. The underlying business models that 
support search engines, email, and other online services are based on 
online advertising revenue. The public benefits by using free 
5 See Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, How People Are Changing Their Own Behavior, Pew 
Research Survey, Mar. 16, 2015, http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/how-people-
are-changing-their-own-behavior/#some-americans-are-adopting-specific-online-
strategies-to-hide-their-information-from-the-government. 
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platforms—search engines, social media, email, and information 
aggregation sites—but this industry is funded by the collection and 
monetization of personal data through systems of highly customized 
online advertising. The intermediation and collection of data are what 
make government surveillance possible.  
 Some loss of trust has also arisen from high-profile cybersecurity 
breaches, such as the massive data breach experienced by U.S. 
retailing giant Target,7 or the Sony Pictures attack.8 During the 2013 
holiday season, hackers compromised department store Target’s 
computer systems and stole the credit card and personal information 
of forty million customers, including addresses of seventy million 
customers. In response to a class action lawsuit, Target offered to pay 
settlements totaling $10 million. The data breach not only led to a loss 
in customer confidence and the resignation of Chief Executive Gregg 
Steinhafel, but also raised questions about the role of private 
companies in protecting consumer data. Target responded to these 
concerns by committing to introducing the Chief Information Security 
Officer position and providing additional security training for 
employees.8 Shortly after the Target data breach, home improvement 
retailer Home Depot disclosed that hackers stole the credit card 
information of fifty-six million customers after infiltrating the 
retailer’s payment systems with malware.9 In addition to gaining 
access to this vast trove of credit card data, the hackers also stole 
email addresses of fifty-three million customers.10 While absconding 
with financial information like credit card numbers is frequently the 
6 Target Press Release, Target Provides Update on Data Breach and Financial Performance 
(Jan. 10, 2014), http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-provides-update-on-data-
breach-and-financial-performance. 
7 Rachel Emma Silverman & Ben Fritz, Data Breach Sets off Upheaval at Sony Pictures, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/data-breach-sets-off-upheaval-at-
sony-pictures-1417657799. 
8 Sara Halzack, Target Data Breach Victims Could Get up to $10,000 Each from Court 
Settlement, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/03/19/target-data-breach-
victims-could-get-up-10000-each-from-court-settlement/. 
9 Robin Sidel, Home Depot's 56 Million Card Breach Bigger than Target's, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 18, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets-
1411073571. 
10 Home Depot Press Release, The Home Depot Reports Findings in Payment Data Breach 
Investigation Confirms Prior Guidance (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://corporate.homedepot.com/MediaCenter/Documents/Press%20Release.pdf. 
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purpose of data breaches, incidents involving the infiltration of 
insurance companies’ networks raise concerns over the targeting of 
medical data and other sensitive personal information. In the most 
extensive breach of medical records, as of this writing, hackers 
compromised medical data, Social Security numbers, and other 
sensitive information of eleven million customers of health insurer 
Premera Blue Cross.11 
 Those who view governments as a source of consumer data 
protection in these private industries have to be reminded that 
personal data breaches are a commensurate problem in the public 
sector. In addition to exposing sensitive personal information, 
government data breaches can also constitute a threat to national 
security when classified, as well as personal, information is accessed.  
 After breaching the networks of the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), a group of hackers, believed to be based in 
China, gained access to personal information and Social Security 
numbers of an estimated twenty-two million current and former U.S. 
federal employees.12 After first reports on the breach of employment 
data, government representatives also cautioned that hackers might 
have had access to sensitive security clearance data.13 Another data 
breach that was intrinsically tied to national security and international 
relations revolved around the infamous cyberattack on Sony Pictures 
that unfolded prior to the release of The Interview, a comedy about 
two journalists tasked with assassinating North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-Un. After a wave of cyberattacks against Sony, a group 
identifying as “Guardians of Peace” claimed responsibility and 
requested the cancellation of the movie’s release.14 While the data 
breach primarily garnered attention for the leak of controversial email 
exchanges between Sony executives and the leak of unreleased 
11 Reuters, Premera Blue Cross Says Data Breach Exposed Medical Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/business/premera-blue-cross-says-data-
breach-exposed-medical-data.html. 
12 Brigid Bowman, More than 22 Million Affected by OPM Hack, ROLL CALL (July 9, 2015, 
4:04 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/hill-blotter/more-than-25-million-affected-by-opm-
hack/?dcz=. 
13 Associated Press, Second Hack of Federal Records Hit Intelligence and Military 
Personnel, The Guardian, June 12, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/12/hacking-personnel-data-4-million-
federal-workers.
14 Arik Hesseldahl, Sony Hackers Offer to Withhold Stolen Data from Promised Leak, 
RE/CODE, Dec. 14, 2014, http://recode.net/2014/12/14/sony-hackers-offer-to-withhold-
stolen-data-from-promised-leak/. 
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movies, the hackers also gained access to a wide range of personal 
information—including the Social Security numbers of 47,000 Sony 
employees.15 While North Korea denied any involvement in the 
cyberattack, the controversy over The Interview shows how data 
breaches are used as political weapons, raising questions not only 
about free expression and international relations, but also about the 
stability and security of Internet infrastructure. This combination of 
government surveillance, private data collection, and human security 
complexities has, by extension, resulted in the measurable loss of trust 
in the governments, private companies, and institutions that run the 
Internet. 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Saba Hamedy & Meg James, Sony Hit with Lawsuit by Former Employees over Email 
Leaks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-sony-class-action-
lawsuit-employees-20141215-story.html. 
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Company/Institution 
Attacked 
Number of 
Records 
Breached 
Additional 
Information 
Target Credit card 
information of 40 
million customers, 
personal 
information of 70 
million customers 
Target offered to pay $10 
million to settle data 
breach, committed to new 
Chief Information 
Security Officer position 
Home Depot Credit card 
information of 56 
million customers, 
email addresses of 
53 million  
Malware went unnoticed 
for several months 
Premera Blue Cross Medical and 
financial data of 11 
million customers 
Largest publicly-known 
breach of medical 
information to date 
United States  
Federal government 
Personnel 
information and 
social security 
numbers of an 
estimated 22 million 
current and former 
federal employees 
and associates  
Chinese hackers suspected 
to be behind breach of 
OPM network; separate 
attack may have 
compromised sensitive 
security clearance 
information 
Sony Vast amount of data, 
including email 
exchanges and 
unreleased movies; 
personal 
information, 
including Social 
Security numbers of 
47,000 employees 
Hackers claiming 
responsibility pressured 
Sony to halt release of The 
Interview. After movie 
theaters refused to show 
the movie, the movie’s 
original release date was 
cancelled and it was later 
released in limited 
theaters 
DESTABILIZING FACTOR #2: THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM AS A PROXY
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 A second destabilizing trend is the co-opting of infrastructures of 
Internet governance, especially the Domain Name System, for 
purposes completely outside of their originally constructed technical 
and policy functions.16 Most infamously, the Egyptian government 
turned to private interconnection and access systems to cut off 
Internet and phone service to its citizens. Denial of service and other 
cybersecurity attacks are increasingly used by governments to disrupt 
alternative media and dissident voices, and by hackers as a political 
statement against governments.17 Law enforcement and large media 
content companies are turning to infrastructures of Internet 
governance to enforce intellectual property rights through so-called 
“three strikes laws” that cut off Internet access to a household if 
repeated infringement occurs.18 These cases raise concerns about free 
expression and economic liberty, as well as collateral damage to the 
Internet itself.  
   The co-opting of the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) is 
perhaps the clearest example of this turn to infrastructures of Internet 
governance for content control and for carrying out a variety of 
external objectives. The DNS is a massive global system that translates 
Internet names (e.g., cnn.com) into numbers (binary IP addresses) so 
that users can locate online resources.19 To provide a sense of a scale, 
the number of such queries resolved per day measures in the hundreds 
of billions range. Unique binary Internet addresses identify the virtual 
location of devices connecting to the Internet, whether assigned 
permanently or temporarily for a session. Instead of typing in a long 
series of 0s and 1s, Internet users type a name, such as 
www.wikipedia.org, and then the DNS translates between the name 
humans use and  the  numbers  digital  devices use to locate a virtual
16 Laura DeNardis, Hidden Levers of Internet Control: An Infrastructure-Based Theory of 
Internet Governance, 15 J. OF INFO. COMM. AND SOC’Y 720, 720-38 (2012) (referred to as 
“the turn to infrastructure” in Internet governance). 
17 John Palfrey, Ethan Zuckerman, Hall Roberts, Jillian York & Ryan McGrady, 2010 
Report on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks,  BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET 
& SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, Dec. 20, 2010, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2010/DDoS_Independent_Media_Human_Ri
ghts. 
18 See, e.g., Joe Karaganis, ed., Media Piracy in Emerging Economies, SOCIAL SCIENCE 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, Mar. 2011, http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-PDF-1.0.4.pdf.  
19 See, e.g., Paul Mockapetris, Domain Names – Concepts and Facilities, RFC 1034, Nov. 
1987; and Domain Names - Implementation and Specification, RFC 1035, Nov. 1987. 
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location online. This system does not actually move information from 
point A to point B. It serves as a directory explaining where to find 
something. Hence, the DNS is sometimes referred to as the Internet’s 
phone book.  
 The DNS is necessary for almost every instance of communication 
over the Internet, and because of its hierarchical design, it creates a 
chokepoint that can be used, in effect, to block access to certain 
content and services, or to monitor what information is being sought 
online. As such, it has been recognized as a site of economic and 
political power, having no connection to keeping the Internet 
operational.  
 Most prominently, the DNS has emerged as a new tool for 
blocking access to websites that infringe intellectual property rights, 
such as selling counterfeit pharmaceutical or luxury products or 
illegally sharing pirated music and movies. These “domain name 
seizures” can be accomplished by asking the Internet registry 
operating each top-level domain (e.g., .com) to remove the data from 
the authoritative name server or map the domain name to a different 
server, such as one with a law enforcement message.20 These seizures 
have long been ordered by the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) agency of the Department of Homeland Security.21  
 There has been tremendous concern in the Internet’s technical 
community over how tampering with the DNS, particularly using local 
redirection techniques, alters the universality and stability of the DNS. 
This concern, among others, was part of the online blackout and 
boycott over the introduction of legislative bills in the United States—
the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA)—and 
how proposed approaches would affect how the Internet works.   
 The same exact techniques of co-opting the DNS can be used for 
censorship and any type of content blocking. Cyberattacks—called 
DNS injection techniques—carry out identity theft and cybercrimes by 
redirecting queries to a counterfeit site designed to appear legitimate. 
In all of these cases, the DNS is being co-opted and, in some cases 
20 Advisory Impacts of Content Blocking via the Domain Name System, SECURITY AND 
STABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Oct. 9 2012), 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-056-en.pdf (information about the 
practice and technical implications of domain name seizures). 
21 Operation in our Sites, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (May 22, 
2014), http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/ipr-in-our-sites (information about the practice of 
domain name seizures). 
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altered, for various political or economic objectives with no 
connection to its original function; this raises questions for the future 
trust and stability in these infrastructures of Internet governance.  
DESTABILIZING FACTOR #3: UNCERTAINTY OVER THE TRANSITION OF
U.S. OVERSIGHT 
 The recognition of infrastructure as a means to advance various 
externalities also raises the stakes over the question of who should 
control Internet governance and architecture, which leads to the third 
area of Internet governance destabilization: uncertainty over the role 
of the U.S. government in Internet oversight.  While there is no single 
system of Internet governance, there is one fairly centralized oversight 
role: the administration of Internet names and numbers.  Each 
domain name used to virtually locate information, such as 
american.edu, and each associated binary number that digital devices 
use to route to this information, must be globally unique. This 
technical requirement for global uniqueness has necessitated some 
centralized coordination. The tasks once performed by a single 
individual are now performed through a global system of 
institutions.22 At the helm is ICANN, but various responsibilities are 
carried out by private companies and global not-for-profit 
institutions, such as registries that allocate numbers and registrars 
that assign names. At the heart of this system is the U.S. government 
because it holds the contract with ICANN, and because the U.S. 
authorizes changes to the Internet’s root zone file, which is the 
authoritative mapping of top-level domains like .com, .uk, .edu, etc. 
onto their associated numbers.23  
 A 1998 Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and ICANN commenced the process of 
internationalizing and privatizing names and numbers coordination, 
22 See Vinton Cerf, I Remember IANA, RFC 2468, Oct. 1998, http://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc2468.txt (Internet name and number assignment was originally done by 
respected Internet engineer Jon Postel working at Stanford Research Institute in a function 
that would eventually be called the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA); RFC 
2468 discusses personal details of Postel’s role.). 
23 A detailed description of how Internet names and numbers are administered is available 
in Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance, ch. 2, Controlling Internet 
Resources, Yale University Press 2014. 
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while also retaining accountability to the U.S. government.24 The most 
contentious, long-term, international concern has been the authority 
of the Commerce Department to approve changes to the root zone file. 
Since 1998, the American position has continuously asserted that 
internationalization and privatization would continue, although U.S. 
authority via the contractual arrangement with ICANN and 
authorization of root zone file changes have continued.  Volumes of 
scholarship have addressed the long history of global tensions over 
American oversight of names and numbers.25  
 The U.S. contractual relationship with ICANN and, especially, 
oversight of changes to the root zone file, long predate Snowden 
surveillance disclosures, WikiLeaks controversies, Facebook privacy 
concerns (and Facebook itself), Internet boycotts over SOPA and 
PIPA, the Stuxnet worm, and many other high-profile Internet 
governance sagas. However, these broader controversies have served 
to heighten attention to the unique role of the United States 
government in overseeing Internet names and numbers. In the 
immediate aftermath of the mass government surveillance 
disclosures, the already extant international pressure to 
internationalize control of names and numbers escalated significantly, 
such as through a Brazilian-hosted global conference known as 
“NETMundial: The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of 
Internet Governance,” at which the U.S. oversight of names and 
numbers was the primary focus of deliberations.26 
 In March of 2014, just prior to the NETMundial gathering, the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) of the Commerce Department announced that the United 
States would transition oversight to the “global multi-stakeholder 
24 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Nov. 25, 1998), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/icann-mou-1998-11-25-en. 
25 See, e.g., MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING 
OF CYBERSPACE (2002); JOHN MATHIASON, INTERNET GOVERNANCE: THE NEW FRONTIER OF 
GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS (2008); LEE BYGRAVE & JON BING, INTERNET GOVERNANCE: 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS (2009). 
26 See NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, NETMUNDIAL (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-
Document.pdf. 
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community” by 2015, under certain conditions.26 The announcement 
was met with a great deal of international enthusiasm, but was 
politicized in the United States with some calling the transition 
“Obama’s Internet surrender.”27 The deadline for the transition was 
later extended to the fall of 2016, with the specifics of the transition 
not yet determined. 
 This is both a symbolic and a real power struggle. If the transition 
fails to occur smoothly, this could result in political reactions that 
assert national sovereignty, but are detrimental to the universal 
characteristics of the Internet, such as the introduction of alternative 
Internet roots or greater government efforts to mandate the 
localization of infrastructure and data within borders—described next.  
DESTABILIZING FACTOR #4: ATTEMPTS TO OVERLAY NATIONAL 
BORDERS ON THE GLOBAL INTERNET 
 The Internet began as an American network but has grown into an 
international network of networks available on every continent and, to 
some extent, in every country.  Of course, the Internet is not universal 
in the sense that very real barriers of access, culture, language, and 
censorship exist. It is universal, however, from the technical design 
standpoint of having the capacity and potentiality to connect to 
anywhere in the world regardless of location, types of access, devices 
used, or applications available. In part, this ability to connect from 
anywhere has provided network design flexibility for technology 
companies. For example, customer service centers, DNS services, and 
enormous server farms may be geographically situated in entirely 
different locations. Site location decisions can be made based on 
market conditions, labor availability, or technical expediency. 
Government regulations in each respective region have always applied 
and created the parameters for regulating content, access, and many 
other areas such as antitrust, computer fraud and abuse, and 
conditions for competition.  
26 NTIA Announces Internet to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions, 
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-
internet-domain-name-functions. 
27 See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Commentary, America’s Internet Surrender, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 18, 2014. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447362610955656. 
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 A significant structural shift in the role of governments in altering 
Internet infrastructure involves attempts to directly regulate how 
private companies implement infrastructure and where this 
infrastructure is located. For example, there are tangible political 
movements to localize or fragment the Internet by creating national 
borders around technologies. Immediately after NSA surveillance 
disclosures, political reactions ranged from statements about wanting 
to route around the United States to avoid switching traffic through 
the many dominant Internet exchange points in the US to creating 
quite walled-off Internet services that simply do not interconnect to 
U.S. users, services, and networks.  
 The most specific of these proposals involve “data localization” 
requirements. Data localization is a general term for a range of 
specific prohibitions and requirements, such as mandating that 
content intermediaries store customer data within the country in 
which the customer resides, restrictions on when or how data is able 
to “cross borders,” taxes on data exports, requirements for consumer 
consent, and rules about storing duplicate or backup data locally. Data 
localization laws already exist in many countries and others are 
forthcoming.28 For example, a Russian law requiring companies to 
store the data of Russian citizens within the Russian border took effect 
in late 2015.  
 The CIGI-Ipsos survey on Global Internet Security and Trust 
polled approximately 23,000 users and found that Internet users 
around the world somewhat favor this type of data localization.29  Yet, 
from an engineering, innovation, and civil liberties perspective, data 
localization creates challenges. Technology companies, whether social 
media providers, search engines, information aggregators, or other 
intermediaries, faced with data localization requirements are forced to 
retool networks. New entrants would not be able to compete globally 
because of the investment costs of locating infrastructure physically 
within each potential market.  
 The effects of such regulation extend far beyond the tech industry. 
A McKinsey & Company survey of chief executives in the financial 
services sector revealed the concern regarding such regulation, with 
impacts ranging from increased organizational complexity to 
28 Anupam Chander & Uyen Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L. J., 677, 680 (2015).  
29 Centre for International Governance Innovation & IPSOS, supra note 4. 
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constraints on efficiency due to having to locate employees and 
infrastructure in local markets.30  
 While creating inefficiencies, managerial and technical 
complexities, and increased costs for large global businesses, the data 
localization requirements would be even more onerous in creating 
financial barriers to small global entrepreneurs and new entrants in 
local markets. Although data storage could be outsourced to cloud 
computing intermediaries with a presence in these various markets, 
the idea of investing in local infrastructure (e.g., servers, people, and 
networks) in every potential market is an intractable barrier to new 
business and innovation, and a violation of the principle of “no 
permanent favorites.”  
DESTABILIZING FACTOR #5: A RESURGENCE OF PROPRIETARY AND 
CONTENT-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACHES 
 Internet innovation and growth are, in part, attributable to open 
standards, the technical specifications that are freely published, 
accessible to anyone, and able to provide assurances that new 
products based on the standard will be interoperable with other 
products and devices—regardless of location, manufacturer, or 
application used. In The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, 
Jonathan Zittrain warned about a shift away from generative technical 
architectures to closed and proprietary approaches that enable 
gatekeepers to control what information can be accessed, rather than 
providing access to the universal Internet.31 A relatively new trend 
supporting his thesis is the rise of “zero-rating” services that provide 
either economic or technical prioritization for some services over 
others. 
 Zero-rating services, often collaborations between mobile 
telecommunication providers and content intermediaries, provide free 
(“zero-rated”) or very low cost access to selected sites. In other words, 
access to these preferred sites does not count against a subscriber’s 
data caps or billing arrangements. Facebook’s Internet.org initiative 
attracted international attention to zero-rating services. The effort was 
30 James Kaplan & Kayvaun Rowshankish, Addressing the Impact of Data Location 
Regulation in Financial Services, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPER 
SERIES NO. 14, May 2015, https://ourinternet-
files.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/no14_web.pdf. 
31 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (2009). 
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a co-operation between Facebook, service providers like Ericsson and 
Samsung, non-profit organizations, and local groups seeking to 
increase Internet connectivity in developing nations.32 Google33 and 
Twitter34 have similarly partnered with mobile providers in select 
countries to provide users with free access to pages within the Google 
ecosystem and Twitter, respectively.  
 The stated objective of these services is to provide affordable 
access to information for users in the developing world for which 
access speeds or mobile subscription costs create barriers. These 
approaches, however, also raise a net neutrality-type concern in that 
they prioritize free access to select sites and services, and also create a 
gatekeeping portal, as opposed to equal access to information 
regardless of the content origination or intermediating company. Such 
zero-rating initiatives may not even be permissible to operate in the 
United States because of the potential impact of the still new open 
Internet rules.  
 Not surprisingly, zero-rating initiatives have come under criticism 
for creating a fragmented Internet rather than one that provides equal 
access to information.35 Zero-rating initiatives also raise concerns over 
market barriers for local content providers and developers, and even 
the creation of potential control points for censorship and 
surveillance.36 Debates over net neutrality in developing countries 
mirror similar concerns in Europe and North America where service 
providers have come under attack for creating market inequalities by 
“zero-rating” their own content and partner content.37 
32 About Internet.org, INTERNET.ORG, https://internet.org/about. 
33 Are You in the Free Zone?, GOOGLE FREE ZONE, http://googlefreezone.com/. 
34 Sarah Perez, Twitter’s ‘Zero’ Service Lets Emerging Markets Tweet for Free, 
TECHCRUNCH, May 29, 2014, http://techcrunch.com/2014/05/29/twitters-emerging-
market-strategy-includes-its-own-version-of-a-facebook-zero-like-service-called-twitter-
access/. 
35 Alex Hern, Facebook Criticized for Creating 'Two Tier Internet' with Internet.org 
Programme, THE GUARDIAN, May 19, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/19/facebook-criticised-for-creating-
two-tier-internet-with-internetorg-programme. 
36 Jeremy Malcolm, Net Neutrality and the Global Digital Divide, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, July 24, 2014, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/net-neutrality-and-
global-digital-divide. 
37 Antonios Drossos, Guest Blog: The Real Threat to the Open Internet is Zero-Rated 
Content, WORLD WIDE WEB FOUNDATION, Feb. 17, 2015, 
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 On the one hand, these new gatekeeping approaches, which 
privilege select portals and content, can improve educational 
opportunities and healthcare in underserved communities. Defending 
the importance of zero-rating services for closing the global digital 
divide, some argue that free access to mainstream sites would allow 
citizens to use additional data to access local sites and services.39 Zero-
pricing initiatives developed by the private sector are also believed to 
help build local Internet infrastructure by fostering consumer 
demand,38 as well as providing more cost-effective and adaptable 
programs than government efforts that address digital divide issues.39 
They are, however, also part of a graduated shift away from the open 
Internet in which individuals can choose to access any information on 
the universal Internet equally to a model in which gatekeepers create 
technical and economic prioritization for their own content and 
platforms.  
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE
 These emerging trends in Internet governance whether originating 
in the private sector, in technological design changes, or in 
government regulations, are real and will have real implications for 
the future of the Internet. The greatest consequence is the possibility 
of fragmentation. Will there be a universal Internet or a fragmented 
Internet that varies depending on national boundaries or private 
gatekeeping? This concern about fragmentation arises in all five of the 
destabilizing conditions addressed in this paper. The loss of trust in 
http://webfoundation.org/2015/02/guest-blog-the-real-threat-to-the-open-internet-is-
zero-rated-content/. 
4:  Darrell M. West, Digital Divide: Improving Internet Access in the Developing World 
Through Affordable Services and Diverse Content, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
AT BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Feb. 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/02/13-digital-divide-
developing-world-west/west_internet-access.pdf. 
38 Noelle Francesca De Guzman, Zero Rating: Enabling or Restricting Internet Access?, 
INTERNET SOCIETY, Sept. 24, 2014, http://www.internetsociety.org/blog/asia-pacific-
bureau/2014/09/zero-rating-enabling-or-restricting-internet-access. 
39 Diana Carew, Zero-Rating: Kick-Starting Internet Ecosystems in Developing Countries, 
PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, Mar. 2015, http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/2015.03-Carew_Zero-Rating_Kick-Starting-Internet-
Ecosystems-in-Developing-Countries.pdf. 
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institutions of Internet governance is creating geopolitical tensions 
over who controls various aspects of the Internet. Concern about 
surveillance is leading governments to introduce policies that 
superimpose physical boundaries that are simply incommensurate 
with how the Internet works at an infrastructural and logical (as well 
as institutional) level. Efforts to tamper with the DNS for content 
control have raised concerns about whether a universal system for 
resolving names into numbers will be sustainable. If the transition of 
U.S. oversight of names and numbers does not proceed, will the 
response be an introduction of alternative, and potentially, non-
interoperable naming systems? Separately, the resurgence of 
proprietary systems harkens back to the closed online systems of the 
1990s. There will be direct implications for access to knowledge, 
Internet stability and universality, free speech, cross-border trade, 
and the cost of doing business. 
 These conditions highlight three characteristics of Internet 
governance: that this governance extends far beyond traditional 
governments to include private sector policies and the design efforts 
of technical communities, that Internet governance conflicts involve 
some of the most pressing public policies of our time, and that 
Internet infrastructure is fully recognized as a site of political and 
economic power and increasingly used as a proxy for broader conflict.  
 Not surprisingly, the confluence of these circumstances has 
created rising geopolitical contention in Internet governance. This 
emergence of contention in Internet governance stems, in part, from 
the erosion of trust in the system, but also from the increasing 
recognition of the Internet as a vital political and economic force, in 
addition to recognition of its underlying infrastructural and 
institutional system of governance as a point of economic and political 
power. At the same time, there are divergent social rules and cultural 
norms within borders that simply do not map neatly onto a 
technological system (and institutional system) that crosses these 
borders. 
 Internet governance will become only more complicated as the 
Internet continues to move from a network of people to a network of 
things. The Internet is no longer a communication network, but a 
control network in which orders of magnitude of more things—
industrial systems, home appliances, health monitoring devices, and 
drones—are connected, rather than people on the planet.  
 The solution to long-term challenges in Internet governance 
requires bringing together the political and the technical, rather than 
dismissing the technical as not politically constructed or the political 
as not technologically constrained. Outsized attention to civil liberties, 
such as individual privacy and free speech or values such as national 
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security and law enforcement, leave the issue of technological stability 
out of the equation. Concern about the stability of the technical 
infrastructure must be reintroduced into discussions, rather than 
serving as a taken-for-granted background system that will simply 
endure. Technology should equally be viewed as a component of the 
solution to destabilizing problems.  
 Solutions require two lenses: a pragmatic operational concern for 
the stable and secure administration of the Internet and a 
simultaneous focus on human rights–including communicative 
expression, individual autonomy and privacy, and economic liberty. 
As an example, bringing these two concerns together to address the 
loss of trust in the Internet leads to solutions, such as end-to-end 
encryption being the default in protocol design and implementation; 
collaborative security in which businesses and citizens take more 
proactive measures to secure networks; continued 
internationalization, rather than nationalization of Internet 
governance; and greater transparency, limitations, and accountability 
for the ways in which governments are turning to these infrastructures 
for geopolitical conflict. 
 At a minimum, the contemporary array of destabilizing conditions 
creates a moment of opportunity to set aside the view of Internet 
governance as “just a technical administration issue” or “clerical 
function,” as some insiders have suggested, and instead view it as a set 
of distributed and multi-stakeholder responsibilities with profound 
implications for what will count as economic and expressive liberty in 
the coming decades. 

